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INTRODUCTION OF THE CISG-AC 
The CISG-AC started as a private initiative supported by the 
Institute of International Commercial Law at Pace University School of 
Law and the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary, University 
of London. The International Sales Convention Advisory Council 
(CISGAC) is in place to support understanding of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and 
the promotion and assistance in the uniform interpretation of the CISG. 
At its formative meeting in Paris in June 2001, Prof. Peter Schlechtriem 
of Freiburg University, Germany, was elected Chair of the CISG-AC for 
a three-year term. Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis of the Centre for Commercial 
Law Studies, Queen Mary, University of London, was elected Secretary. 
The founding members of the CISG-AC were Prof. Emeritus Eric E. 
Bergsten, Pace University School of Law; Prof. Michael Joachim Bonell, 
University of Rome La Sapienza; Prof. E. Allan Farnsworth, Columbia 
University School of Law; Prof. Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University 
School of Law; Prof. Sir Roy M. Goode, Oxford, Prof. Sergei N. Lebedev, 
Maritime Arbitration Commission of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the Russian Federation; Prof. Jan Ramberg, University of 
Stockholm, Faculty of Law; Prof. Peter Schlechtriem, Freiburg University; 
Prof. Hiroo Sono, Faculty of Law, Hokkaido University; Prof. Claude 
Witz, Universität des Saarlandes and Strasbourg University. Members of 
the Council are elected by the Council. At subsequent meetings, the 
CISGAC elected as additional members Prof. Pilar Perales Viscasillas, 
Universidad Carlos III, Madrid; Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer, 
University of Basel; Prof. John Y Gotanda, Villanova University; Prof. 
Michael G. Bridge, London School of Economics; Prof. Han Shiyuan, 
Tsinghua University, Prof. Yesim Atamer, Istanbul Bilgi University, 
Turkey, and Prof. Ulrich Schroeter, University of Mannheim. Prof. Jan 
Ramberg served for a three-year term as the second Chair of the CISGAC. 
At its 11th meeting in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, Prof. Eric E. 
Bergsten of Pace University School of Law was elected Chair of the CISG-
AC and Prof. Sieg Eiselen of the Department of Private Law of the 
University of South Africa was elected Secretary. At its 14th meeting in 
Belgrade, Serbia, Prof. Ingeborg Schwenzer of the University of Basel was 
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1. OPINION 
Article 79 CISG  
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that 
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to 
perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if: 
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and 
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that 
paragraph were applied to him. 
(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which the 
impediment exists. 
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment 
and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have 
known of the impediment, he is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to 
claim damages under this Convention. 
1.The following Rules on hardship apply, unless the contract otherwise 
provides. 
2.The CISG governs cases of hardship. 
3.A party is bound to fulfil its obligations even if performance has become 
more onerous, unless there is hardship. 
4.There is hardship when a change of circumstances beyond the control 
of a party makes performance excessively onerous, if that party could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the change into account or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.  
5.Such hardship may arise when the cost of performance has increased or 
the value of the performance has diminished. 
6.Such hardship may also arise from events occurring before the 
conclusion of the contract if the parties did not know and could not have 
been aware of these events. 
7. In assessing whether hardship exists the following nonexclusive factors 
should be taken into account: 
a) whether the risk of a change of circumstances was assumed by either 
party; 
b) whether the contract is of a speculative nature; 
c) whether and to what extent there have been previous market 
fluctuations; 
d) the duration of the contract; 
e) whether the seller has obtained the goods from its own supplier; 
f) whether either party has hedged against market changes. 
8. The party affected by hardship must give notice to the other party of 
the circumstances and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is 




not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the party 
affected knew or ought to have known of the hardship situation, it is liable 
for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
9. In case of hardship, nothing prevents either party from exercising any 
right other than to claim damages and require performance of the 
obligation affected by hardship.  
10. The exemption due to hardship has effect for the period during which 
hardship exists. 
11. Under the CISG, the parties have no duty to renegotiate the contract 
in case of hardship. 
12. Under the CISG, a court or arbitral tribunal may not adapt the contract 
in case of hardship. 
13. Under the CISG, a court or arbitral tribunal may not bring the contract 
to an end in case of hardship. 
2. COMMENTS 
INTRODUCTION  
0.1 Unexpected changes of circumstances may constitute one of the 
major problems parties face in international trade, especially for those in 
long term or complex contracts. Trade at a global scale has augmented the 
likelihood for greater imponderables given the involvement of multiple 
actors from different countries in production and procurement of goods 
linked to various contracts. Changes in political and economic policies, 
social unrest and natural phenomena are among the events that could 
considerably affect the very basis of the bargain between contracting 
parties. There may be a global or regional pandemic, an earthquake, a 
flood, a terrorist attack, a sudden increase on import tariffs in one of the 
production countries, forcing the producer to resort to countries with 
much higher production costs; import or export bans may hinder the 
envisaged flow of goods; or price fluctuations that were not foreseeable at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract may make the performance by 
the seller unduly burdensome or may devaluate the contract performance 
for the buyer. 
0.2 In all legal systems, the principle pacta sunt servanda or sanctity of 
contract places the burden of such changes in the original contracting 
conditions upon the obligor. However, since the classic Roman law, the 
concurrent principle of impossibilium nulla est obligatio, or there is no 
obligation to perform impossible things,1 has constituted a valid 
exemption to perform. Furthermore, under the canon law doctrine of rebus 
 
1 The Digest 50.17.185 also cited in James Gordley, 'Impossibility and Changed and 
Unforeseen Circumstances', The American Journal of Comparative Law, 52/3 (2004), 513-30 
at 514. 
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sic stantibus, an unforeseeable and extraordinary change of circumstances 
rendering a contractual obligation significantly burdensome was given due 
consideration in determining liability.2 Since early days, impossibility, force 
majeure or the like have become grounds for exemption in every legal 
system.3 However, the question whether simple changes in the 
surrounding economic conditions, also known as hardship, may exempt 
the debtor from liability for lack of performance has been a highly debated 
issue in various legal systems and under some international law 
instruments.4  
0.3 Today, many civil law jurisdictions accept the theory of 
hardship.5 The most recent acknowledgement by statute can be found in 
France.6 English law seems to reject any notion of relief for changed 
 
2 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Third edn.: Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1998).: “This doctrine may be traced through the Middle Ages from the 
Glossattors right up to Grotius and Pufendorf; it was accepted in the Codex 
Maximilianeus bavaricus civilis of 1756 and then in the Prussian General Land Law of 
1764”. See also Dubravka Klasiček and Marija Ivatin, 'Modification or Dissolution of 
Contracts Due to Changed Circumstances', IZMJENA I RASKID UGOVORA ZBOG 
PROMIJENJENIH OKOLNOSTI., 34/2 (2018), 27-55 at 29. 
3 Germany § 275 CC; Italy Art. 1256 CC; France: Art. 1218 CC; United States § 265 
Restatement (2d) of Contracts (Restatement), § 2-615 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
For similar rules in other legal systems see, Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales 
and Contract Law at 651 et seq. 
4 Zweigert and Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law at 520-22. The actual trigger for this 
discussion was the enormous rise in prices due to World War I (1914-1918), see Hannes 
Rösler, 'Hardship in German Codified Private Law: In Comparative Perspective to 
English, French and International Contract Law ', European Review of Private Law 15 (2007) 
at 491. 
5 Argentina Art. 1091 CC; Armenia Art. 467 CC; Austria §§ 936, 1052, 1170 BGB a 
through analogy; Azerbaijan Art. 422 CC, Bolivia Art. 581(1)(4) CC; Brazil Art. 478, 479 
CC; China Art. 26 PRC Contract Law Interpretation (2) and Art. 227-2 CC; Colombia 
Art. 868 Com C; Croatia Art. 369 Civil Obligations Act; Egypt: Art. 147(2) CC; France 
Art. 1195 CC; Germany § 313 BGB; Greece Art. 388 CC; Italy Art. 1467 CC, Iraq Art. 
146(2) CC; Kuwait Art. 198 CC; Libya Art. 147 CC; Lithuania Art. 6.204 CC; Montenegro 
Art. 128 Law on Obligations; Paraguay: Art. 672 CC; Portugal Art. 437 CC; Qatar Art. 
171 (2) CC; Russia Art. 451 CC; Slovenia Art. 112 Obligations Code; Syria: Art. 148(2) 
CC; Taiwan Art. 227-2 CC; The Netherlands Art. 6:258 CC (BW); Ukraine Art. 652 CC. 
See also Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 666. 
6 Article 1195 of the New French Civil Code (2016) for the first time allows a private law 
contract to be modified in case of a change of circumstances. Before, French law was not 
favourable to the concept of hardship; the theory of imprévision applied to administrative 
contracts only. See Francois Chénedé, Le Nouveau Droit Des Obligations Et Des Contrats: 
Consolidations - Innovations - Perspective (France: Dalloz, 2016) at 142, para. 25.51; Alain 
Bénabent, Droit Des Obligations (16 edn., Précis Domat Droit Privé; France: LGDJ, 2017) 
at 253, para. 309. 




circumstances that do not amount to impossibility.7 However, an 
exception may be granted to this general rule under the doctrine of 
“frustration of contract” if the performance of the contract is rendered 
useless by the change of circumstances.8 In the United States a party may 
be exempted if as a result of supervening events, performance of the 
contract, though remaining physically possible, has become severely more 
burdensome for that party.9  
0.4 At the international level, the 2016 UNIDROIT Principles on 
International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT PICC),10 as well as 
other uniform soft law projects such as the 1999 Principles on European 
Contract Law (PECL),11 the 2008 Draft of a Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR),12 and the Principles of Latin American Contract Law (PLACL),13 
expressly provide for exemption of liability in case of a substantial change 
of circumstances. In 1985, 2003 and 2020, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) published model clauses on hardship.14 
 
7 H. G. Beale and Joseph Chitty, Chitty on Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at 
paras. 23-061; Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 652, para. 
45.13. 
8 Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 652, para. 45.13; 
Christoph Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption 
for Non-Performance in International Arbitration (International Arbitration Law Library, 18; 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008) at 410. 
9 United States § 2-615 UCC. The Restatement Second, Contracts 2d, reiterates this 
position: see American Law Institute Restatement on the Law of Contracts (2ed, 
American Law Institute Publishers, St Paul, Minnesota, 1981) § 261; the seminal case on 
this rule is Transatlantic Financing Corporation, Appellant, v. United States of America, 
Appellee, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) cited in Alissa Palumbo, Modern Law of Sales in 
the United States, ed. Ingeborg Schwenzer (International Commerce and Arbitration, 17; 
The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2015) at 165, 66; Also see Larry Dimatteo, 
International Contracting: Law and Practice (Third Edition edn; The Netherlands: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2013) at 264, para. 7.23. 
10 See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, 2016 (UNIDROIT PICC) Article 6.2.3. 
11 See Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL) Article 6:111, Comment note 1, 328. 
12 See Study Group on a European Civil Code, Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) Article III – 1:110. 
13 See the Principles of Latin American Contract Law 2018 (PLACL), Article 84, available 
at Rodrigo Momberg and Stefan Vogenauer, 'The Principles of Latin American Contract 
Law: Text, Translation, and Introduction', Uniform Law Review/Revue De Droit Uniforme, 
23/1 (2018). 
14 ICC, Force Majeure and Hardship, Paris 1985 (ICC Publ No. 421); ICC Force Majeure 
Clause 2003 and ICC Hardship Clause 2003, Developed by the ICC Commission on 
Commercial Law and Practice, Draftsman-in-chief: Charles Debattista, ICC Publication 
No. 650, ICC Publishing, 2003 (ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clause 2003); ICC 
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0.5 The 1980 UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG), however, does not contain a specific provision dealing with 
questions of hardship. Article 79 CISG relieves a party from paying 
damages only if the breach of contract was due to an impediment beyond 
its control.  
0.6 This opinion supports the application of Article 79 CISG to 
govern situations of economic impediments also known as hardship. For 
the sake of good order, economic impediment and hardship will be used 
as synonyms in this Opinion and refer to change of circumstances that 
fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract, in making 
performance by one party significantly more onerous or in decreasing its 
value considerably.  
0.7 This Opinion reviewed different State court decisions and 
arbitral awards where the application of the CISG to hardship scenarios 
has been considered up to this date.15 In one case, it was considered that 
Article 79 CISG did not govern hardship situations and applied, instead, 
domestic law.16 In the remaining cases, the judge or arbitrator decided that 
hardship was a type of impediment governed by Article 79 CISG. Only in 
one case, did a court find that the requirements in Article 79 CISG were 
met and ordered that the parties should renegotiate the contract.17 Annex 
1 provides a summary of the above case law, focusing on the threshold 
leading to an economic impediment and the remedies available under the 
CISG according to courts and arbitral tribunals. 
 
Force Majeure And Hardship Clauses March 2020, available at 
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-
clauses-march2020.pdf 
15 These cases were gathered from the internet, using the traditional research engines, 
such as google, yahoo.com, etc. and from the most known CISG case law webpages, 
such as CISG-online, Pace CISG database, UNILEX and UNCITRAL CLOUT: 
Tribunale Civile di Monza, 14 January1993, CISG-online Case No. 540; Hof van Cassatie, 
19 June 2009, CISG-online Case No. 1963; France Cass civ 1ère, 30 June 2004, CISG–
online Case No. 870 (Goods involved: cases made from polyurethane foam); Rechtbank 
van Koophandel, Tongeren, 25 January 2005, No 1960, CISG-online Case No. 1106 
(Goods involved: steel); Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 February 
1998, CISG-online Case No. 436 (Goods involved: steel rope); Separate Award, SCC 
Arbitration No. V2014/078/080, 31 May 2017, CISG-online Case No.4683, paras. 2594-
2597 (as an argument of the Respondent [Gazprom] that the Arbitral Tribunal neither 
addressed nor contradicted); Rechtbank van Koophandel, Hasselt, 2 May 1995, CISG-
online Case No. 371; Cour d'Appel de Colmar, 12 June 2001, CISG-online Case No. 694; 
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, No 167, CISG-online Case No. 261: 
CIETAC, 2 May 1996, CISG–online Case No. 1067 (based on frustration). 
16 Tribunale Civile di Monza, 14 January1993, CISG-online Case No. 540. 
17 Hof van Cassatie, 19 June 2009, CISG-online Case No. 1963. 




0.8 This opinion also considered a good number of seminal works 
from scholars dealing with the issue of hardship under the CISG. Most 
scholars agree that hardship is a type of impediment governed by Article 
79 CISG.18 There are, nevertheless, a few differences of opinion regarding 
the threshold of economic impediments under Article 79 CISG and the 
remedies resulting from the Convention. Annex 2 summarizes this 
scholarship and provides for relevant excerpts of the authors’ individual 
views. 
0.9 This opinion also makes reference to provisions in other uniform 
law projects –the UNIDROIT PICC, the PECL, the DCFR and the 
PLACL– and several domestic law provisions dealing with hardship or 
similar impediments from a comparative law perspective. Annex 3 
analyzes these international soft law and domestic law provisions. 
0.10 In light of the ongoing debate in case law and doctrine regarding 
the application of the CISG to hardship situations, and the wide catalogue 
of answers provided by comparative law, this opinion furnishes an 
 
18 Yesim M. Atamer, 'Article 79', in Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis, and Pilar Perales 
Viscasillas (eds.), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods - Commetary 
(München: Hart Publishing, 2011) at 1088, 89 para. 79; Michael G. Bridge, The 
International Sale of Goods (4th Fourth edn; Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 618, para. 12.72; 
Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 213; CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of 
Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro 
Garro, 12 Oct 2007; Franco Ferrari and Marco Torsello, International Sales Law - CISG (In 
a Nutshell: West Academic Publisher, 2014) at 326, 27; Harry M. Flechtner, 'The 
Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention Including Comments on Hardship 
Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court', Belgrade Law 
Review, 59/3 (2011) at 93; Harry M. Flechtner, 'Uniformity and Politics: Interpreting and 
Filling Gaps in the CISG', in Peter Mankowski and Wolfgang Wurmnest (ed.), Festschrift 
Für Ulrich Magnus. Zum 70. Geburtstag (Sellier European Law Publishers 2014) at 200, 01; 
John O. Honnold and Harry M. Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 627, para. 432.2, Ingeborg Schwenzer, 'Article 79', in 
Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (4th edn; London: OUP, 2016) at 1142, para. 31; Yasutoshi 
Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract 
through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying 
Something', Pace International Law Review, 30/2 (2018) at 364-68; Joseph Lookofsky, 
Understanding the CISG (Fourth Worldwide Edition edn., Law & Business: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2012) at 150, para. 6.32; Peter Schlechtriem and Petra Butler, UN Law on 
International Sales (Berlin: Springer, 2009) at 203, para. 91; Peter Schlechtriem, 'Transcript 
of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG Scholars Discuss Contract 
Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract 
Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much More by Harry M. 
Flechtner', Journal of Law & Commerce, 18 (1999) at 236, 37; Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, 
Global Sales and Contract Law at 670, para. 45.98. 
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acceptable solution according to the needs of the international trade 
community for legal efficiency and certainty. This opinion provides the 
necessary guidelines to determine the existence of hardship under Article 
79 CISG. It also sets out the obligations of the parties and the remedies 
available in hardship situations pursuant to the Convention’s objective to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.19 In particular, it clarifies that the parties have no duty 
to renegotiate the contract and that a court or arbitral tribunal may not 
adapt the contract or bring it to an end in case of hardship under the CISG. 
2.1. THE FOLLOWING RULES ON HARDSHIP APPLY, UNLESS THE 
CONTRACT OTHERWISE PROVIDES 
1.1 The terms of the contract should be the starting point to 
determine whether hardship exists and its consequences. The parties may 
expressly or impliedly agree upon the allocation of the risk of events 
leading to hardship. They may also agree upon the relevant threshold of 
hardship and the remedies that the aggrieved party may be entitled to. 
Different hardship model clauses are available for this purpose,20 including 
the 1985, 2003 and 2020 editions of the ICC Hardship Clause.21 This 
determination is done by contract interpretation pursuant to Article 8 
CISG. 
 
19 A mandate of Art. 7 CISG. 
20 See for example, Clause 16.3 (Hardship) of Standard Model Contract for International 
Commercial Sale of Goods and Clause 9.4 of the International Long-Term Supply of 
Goods, by ” International Trade Centre (Itc), Model Contracts for Small Firms: Legal Guidance for 
Doing International Business (Geneva: ITC, 2010) at 54, 55, 70, 71. available at available at 
http://www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37603; See clauses in Patrick 
Ostendorf, International Sales Terms (München: Hart Publishing, 2014) at 121. and Ulrich 
Magnus, 'Application of Boilerplate Clauses under German Law', in Guiditta Cordero-
Moss (ed.), Boilerplate Clauses, International Commercial Contracts and Applicable Law (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 206, 07. 
21 ICC, Force Majeure and Hardship, Paris 1985 (ICC Publ No. 421); ICC Force Majeure 
Clause 2003 and ICC Hardship Clause 2003, Developed by the ICC Commission on 
Commercial Law and Practice, Draftsman-in-chief: Charles Debattista, ICC Publication 
No. 650, ICC Publishing, 2003 (ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clause 2003); ICC 
Force Majeure And Hardship Clauses March 2020, available at 
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-
clauses-march2020.pdf 




2.1.1.HARDSHIP RISK ALLOCATION: 
1.2 It is up to the parties to define their respective spheres of risk in 
the contract.22 One party may have expressly or impliedly assumed the risk 
for a fundamental change of circumstances or, on the contrary, certain 
risks may have been expressly or impliedly excluded.23  
1.3 A hardship clause in a CISG contract may expressly exclude the 
possibility to rely on hardship. A similar clause may narrow down the 
events that may entitle a party to exemption under the same doctrine. The 
choice of an Incoterms rule determines the point of delivery and places 
the risk as regards transport, export or import control, tariffs, etc. on one 
of the parties. Despite such allocation of risks and duties, a party might 
demonstrate that delivery or performance of obligations under an 
Incoterms or contract clause have been affected by an impediment that 
meets the requirements of Article 79 CISG. 
1.4 The speculative nature of long term contracts with fixed price 
clauses may, in some cases, be regarded as an implied acceptance of the 
risks of changing market conditions.24 
1.5 Prior practices between the parties or international usages under 
Article 9 CISG, may integrate the contract with respect to risk allocation. 
RELEVANT THRESHOLD: 
1.6 Whether a party is affected by hardship, i.e. when the equilibrium 
of the contract has been fundamentally altered, may also be agreed upon 
by the parties. A provision in their contract may establish the degree of 
increase in the costs of performance or of the decrease in the value of 
performance necessary for a hardship exemption. The ICC Hardship 
 
22 Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 February 1998, CISG-online Case No. 
436; It is also believed that the risk allocation is dependent on the parties’ choice of law 
at the beginning: see generally Gustavo Moser, 'Choice of Law, Brexit and the ‘Ice Cream 
Flavour’ Dilemma', Kluwer Arbitration Blog (December 2018: Wolters Kluwer, 2018). See 
also Ewan McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', in Stefan Vogenauer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Picc) (Second edn; Oxford: OUP, 
2015c) at 818, para. 15. A best practice analysis of force majeure and hardship contract 
clauses is provided in Ostendorf, International Sales Terms at 121 et seq. 
23 See Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for 
Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 147, 48. Avery W. Katz, 'Remedies for Breach 
of Contract under the CISG', International Review of Law and Economics, 25 (2006) at 391; 
CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Comment para. 39; 
McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 818, para. 15.: “assumption of risk need not to be express; 
it can be inferred from the circumstances or from the nature of the contact”. 
24 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 439, 40.  
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Clause 2020, for example, states a threshold for change in circumstances 
that may differ from the criterion found in domestic laws and international 
uniform law.25 
1.7 Prior practices between the parties or international usages under 
Article 9 CISG may also fill the gaps in the contract on the question of 
threshold. 
AGREED REMEDIES: 
1.8 The parties may agree upon the consequences or remedies to 
ensue when hardship takes place. For example, the ICC Hardship Clause 
2020 edition provides that the parties are bound to negotiate alternative 
contractual terms that reasonably allow to overcome the consequences of 
the changed circumstances within a reasonable time after the invocation 
of the clause.26  
1.9 The parties may plan in advance some contractual or procedural 
mechanisms to encourage renegotiation of their obligations in case of 
hardship. Stipulating an agreed sum in case of breach of renegotiations in 
good faith may encourage continuance and provide some certainty to 
traders.27 
1.10 The parties may also agree on having the performances under a 
contract rebalanced by a third party in case of hardship. Different hardship 
model clauses provide for such a possibility,28 perhaps influenced by the 
 
25 See ICC Hardship Clause 2020, para. (2)(a)(b) “2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this 
Clause, where a party to a contract proves that: a) the continued performance of its 
contractual duties has become excessively onerous due to an event beyond its 
reasonable control which it could not reasonably have been expected to have taken 
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract; and that b) it could not 
reasonably have avoided or overcome the event or its consequences, the parties are 
bound, within a reasonable time of the invocation of this Clause, to negotiate alternative 
contractual terms which reasonably allow to overcome the consequences of the event”. 
26 See ICC Hardship Clause 2020, para. (2)(b), which was already in the ICC Hardship 
Clause 2003 para. (2)(b). 
27 Pascal Hachem, Agreed Sums Payable Upon Breach of an Obligations, ed. Ingeborg 
Schwenzer (International Commercial Law, 7; The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2011) at 45. 
28 See for example, Clause 16.3 (Hardship) of Standard Model Contract for International 
Commercial Sale of Goods and Clause 9.4 of the International Long-Term Supply of 
Goods, by the International Trade Center (an agency of the World Trade Organization): 
“[Option: See comment at the beginning of Article [..]. Add if wished; otherwise delete. 
(4). If the Parties fail to reach agreement on the requested revision within [specify time limit if 
appropriate], a party may resort to the dispute resolution procedure provided in Article 21. The 
[court/arbitral tribunal] shall have the power to make any revision to this contract that it finds just and 
equitable in the circumstances or to terminate this contract at a date and on terms to be fixed” (Itc), 




1985 edition of the ICC Hardship Clause.29 Long term supply contracts 
often contain clauses for the revision of prices combined with multi-tier 
dispute resolution clauses that promote preliminary talks and 
negotiation.30 Adaptation may also be exercised by a named third party, 
usually an expert in the field,31 often practiced in the revision of price 
clauses in long term contracts. But the contract might be directly or 
subsidiarily adapted by a court or an arbitrator, depending on the drafting 
of the contract. The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 had abandoned the 
remedy of revision of the contract by a third party. Option 3B of the latest 
edition of the ICC Hardship Clause (2020), reintroduces a similar option 
entitling the parties to request the adaption or termination of the contract 
by a judge or arbitrator.32 The judge or arbitrator may decide on these two 
alternatives, opting for termination in those cases where adaptation is not 
reasonably possible.33 
1.11 Option 3A of the ICC Hardship Clause 2020 provides that, if 
the parties are unable to agree on alternative contract terms, the aggrieved 
party may terminate the contract on its initiative. Under option 3C, either 
 
Model Contracts for Small Firms: Legal Guidance for Doing International Business at 54, 55, 70, 
71. available at http://www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37603. 
29 ICC, Force Majeure and Hardship, Paris 1985 (ICC Publ No. 421): “Third alternative (5). 
If the Parties fail to agree on the revision of the contract within a time-limit of 90 days of the request, 
either Party may bring the issue of revision before the arbitral forum, if any, provided for in the contract, 
or otherwise the competent Courts.”, available at https://www.trans-lex.org/700650/_/icc-
force-majeure-and-hardship-paris-1985-/  
30 See clauses in Ostendorf, International Sales Terms at 121. and Magnus, 'Application of 
Boilerplate Clauses under German Law', at 206, 07. See also Clause 9.4 of the 
International Long-Term Supply of Goods, by the International Trade Center (an agency 
of the World Trade Organization): “[Option: See comment at the beginning of Article 
[..]. Add if wished; otherwise delete. (4). If the Parties fail to reach agreement on the requested 
revision within [specify time limit if appropriate], a party may resort to the dispute resolution procedure 
provided in Article 21. The [court/arbitral tribunal] shall have the power to make any revision to this 
contract that it finds just and equitable in the circumstances or to terminate this contract at a date and 
on terms to be fixed” (Itc), Model Contracts for Small Firms: Legal Guidance for Doing International 
Business at 54, 55, 70, 71. available at 
http://www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37603 
31 The ICC Hardship Clause 1985 stipulates, for example, that: “Fourth alternative, 5. Failing 
an agreement of the Parties on the revision of the contract within a time-limit of 90 days of the request 
either Party may refer the case to the ICC Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual 
Relations in Order to obtain the appointment of a third Person (or a board of three members) in 
accordance with the provisions of the rules for the regulation of contractual relations of the ICC. The third 
Person shall decide on the Parties' behalf whether the conditions for revision provided in Paragraph 1 are 
satisfied. If so he shall revise the contract on an equitable basis in order to ensure that neither party suffers 
excessive prejudice.” 
32 ICC Hardship Clause 2020, para. 3 option B. 
33 See ICC Hardship Clause 2020, Comments under Option 3. 
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party may request the judge or arbitrator to declare the termination of the 
contract. 
2.2. THE CISG GOVERNS CASES OF HARDSHIP 
2.1 The CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7 has already 
determined that Article 79 CISG covers hardship situations.34 Opinion 
No. 7 addresses the drafting history of Article 79,35 where the question 
whether economic difficulties should give rise to an exemption was highly 
controversial.36 This background led some scholars to argue that there was 
no room to consider hardship under Article 79 CISG,37 especially during 
the first years after the coming into force of the Convention.38 Yet, there 
was no clear exclusion of hardship from the events leading to exemption 
under Article 79 CISG.39  
 
34 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Rule 3.2. Comment para. 
38. 
35 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Rule 3.1. Comment paras. 
29 and 30. See also Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: 
Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 216; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1088, 
para. 78. 
36 See Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for 
Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 216; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1088, para. 78. 
37 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Rule 3.1. Comment para. 
26, citing B. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in International Sales: The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods § 5.02, at 5-4 (Parker School of 
Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, ed. Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit, 
1984), available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html>. 
38 Scholars taking this view include Bernard Audit, La vente internationale de marchandises. 
Convention des Nations Unies du 11 avril 1980, Paris, LGDJ, at 174,75 cited by Brunner, Force 
Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in 
International Arbitration at 216, fn. 1100; B. Nicholas, Impracticability and Impossibility in 
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in International 
Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods § 5.02, at 5-
4 (Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, ed. Nina M. 
Galston & Hans Smit, 1984), available at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas1.html>; Tallon, in Bianca-Bonell 
Commentary on the International Sales Law, Giuffrè: Milan (1987), para. 3.1.2., available 
at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html 
39 The Norwegian delegation proposed that paragraph 3 of Article 65 of the 1978 
UNCITRAL Draft Convention should be changed in the following way: “[…] 
Nevertheless, the party who fails to perform is permanently exempted to the extent that, 
after the impediment is removed, the circumstances are so radically changed that it would 
be manifestly unreasonable to hold him liable”. See the Norwegian proposal 




2.2 Today, however, it is more or less unanimously accepted in court 
and arbitral decisions,40 as well as in scholarly writings,41 that Article 79 
CISG governs hardship situations. In addition, general principles 
underlying the CISG, such as reasonableness and duty to cooperate (e.g., 
Arts. 39, 46, 48 and 54 CISG) may be taken into account in the context of 
a situation of hardship.  
2.3 Accordingly, there are no legal grounds to resort to domestic 
concepts of hardship,42 as there is no gap in the CISG regarding the 
debtor’s invocation of economic impediments.43 If one were to hold 
otherwise, domestic concepts such as frustration of purpose, rebus sic 
stantibus, fundamental mistake or Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage would all 
 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.191/Rev.1) in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 10 March-11 April 1980 (Official Records, New 
York, 1981) 381. 
40 However, courts have often decided that the equilibrium of the contract was not 
fundamentally altered. Therefore, the alleged impediment was non-existent. See 
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12 February 1998, CISG-online Case 
No. 436; Rechtbank van Koophandel, Hasselt, 2 May 1995, CISG-online Case No. 371; 
Tribunale Civile di Monza, 29 March 1993, CISG-online Case No. 102; Cour d'Appel de 
Colmar, 12 June 2001, CISG-online Case No. 694; Hof van Cassatie, 19 June 2009, 
CISG-online Case No. 1963 granting a right to renegotiate the contract to a seller for a 
70% price increase in steel after the conclusion of the contract, Separate Award, SCC 
Arbitration No. V2014/078/080, 31 May 2017, CISG-online Case No.4683. para.2662 
(as an argument of the Respondent [Gazprom] that the Arbitral Tribunal neither 
contradicted nor expressly accepted). These decisions can be found by searching the case 
number on the CISG-online website at http://www.cisg-online.ch/ .  
41 In addition to CISG AC Opinion No. 7 see Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1142, para. 31; 
Schlechtriem and Butler, UN Law on International Sales at 203, para. 91; Brunner, Force 
Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in 
International Arbitration at 213; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1088, para. 79; Honnold and 
Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales at 627, para. 432.2; Joseph Lookofsky, 
Understanding the CISG (Fourth Worldwide Edition edn., Law & Business: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2012) at 150, para. 6.32; Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, 
and Adaptation of Contract through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound 
and Fury, but Signifying Something', at 364, 65. 
42 Honnold and Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales at 615, 27, paras. 425, 32.2; 
Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1142, para. 31; Separate Award, SCC Arbitration No. 
V2014/078/080, 31 May 2017, CISG-online Case No.4683. para.2662 (as an argument 
of the Respondent [Gazprom] that the Arbitral Tribunal neither contradicted nor 
expressly accepted). 
43 Flechtner, 'The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention Including Comments 
on Hardship Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court', at 
97; taking a different view see Tribunale Civile di Monza, 14 January1993, CISG-online 
Case No. 540. 
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have to be considered, which would undermine unification of the law of 
sales in a very important area.44 
2.3. A PARTY IS BOUND TO FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS EVEN IF 
PERFORMANCE HAS BECOME MORE ONEROUS, UNLESS THERE IS 
HARDSHIP 
3.1 A party’s right to require the other party to perform the agreed 
obligation follows from the binding character of the contract and the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda reflected in Articles 28, 46, 62, etc. CISG.45 
A party must perform its obligations irrespective of the burden it could 
face in performing.46 In other words, the terms of the contract must 
nonetheless be followed even if that party experiences important losses 
instead of the expected profits. 
3.2 However, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is not an absolute 
one. When unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances are such that they 
lead to a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract, they 
may create an impediment exempting a party from performance and 
liability pursuant to Article 79 CISG. 
2.4. THERE IS HARDSHIP WHEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND 
THE CONTROL OF A PARTY MAKES PERFORMANCE EXCESSIVELY 
ONEROUS, IF THAT PARTY COULD NOT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED 
TO HAVE TAKEN THE CHANGE INTO ACCOUNT OR TO HAVE 
AVOIDED OR OVERCOME IT OR ITS CONSEQUENCES 
4.1 Article 79(1) CISG provides that a party is exempted from 
liability for damages only if the failure to perform is due to, first, an 
 
44 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Rule 3.1, Comment para. 
26. 
45 Florian Mohs, 'Article 62', in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (4th edn; London: OUP, 
2016) at 906, para. 1; Ulrich G. Schoeter, 'Does the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention Reflect 
Universal Values? The Use of the CISG as a Model for Law Reform and Regional 
Specificities', Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. , 41/1 (2018) at 20. 
46 See Ulrich Magnus, 'General Principles of the UN-Sales Law', Rabels Zeitschrift fur 
auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht, 59/3, 4 (1995) at 486-87 : “(2) Pacta sunt servanda. 
-- The basic rule that contracts are binding is not expressly mentioned in the CISG. 
However, it is implied in numerous provisions, such as Art. 30 and 53 CISG, which 
determine the duty to deliver and the duty to effect payment. Particularly Arts. 71-73 and 
79 show that the binding effect of the contract cannot be avoided in cases such as a 
simple change of circumstances or frustration of contract, but only if the requirements 
listed in these provisions are present; without the binding nature of the contract these 
provisions would not make sense”. 




impediment beyond its control, second, that such party could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken this impediment into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract and, third, to have avoided or 
overcome this impediment or its consequences.47  
4.2 Hardship may be regarded as a special type of “impediment” 
under Article 79 CISG; all that is added on the level of prerequisites is a 
clarification of the term impediment. The mere fact that performance has 
been rendered more onerous than could reasonably have been anticipated 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract does not exempt a party from 
performing the contract.48 In international law instruments, hardship may 
be found only if the performance of the contract has become excessively 
onerous49 or if the utility of performance has considerably decreased, 50or 
if the equilibrium of the contract has been fundamentally altered.51 As 
addressed next, a similar approach should be taken under the CISG. 
HARDSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT BEYOND CONTROL: 
4.3 Only impediments that are outside of a party’s sphere of control 
can lead to exemption under Article 79 CISG. Objective circumstances 
that prevent performance usually encompass nature’s events such as 
floods, storms, fire, frosts, epidemics, etc. They also include State or 
human interventions, for example, new legislation, government acts, war, 
terrorist attacks, etc.52 These “external” circumstances are different from 
personal or corporate ones which impair a party’s ability to perform.  
4.4 The distinction between a party’s sphere of risk and external 
impediments will primarily result from the parties’ allocation of risks in 
the contact, their practices or international usages under Article 9 CISG. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the disadvantaged party will carry the risk for 
circumstances that have their origin in its own person or corporation. For 
example, labour strikes, financial strain or difficulties, etc. Even 
unforeseeable illness, arrest, death of the disadvantaged party or key 
individuals in their corporation, attachment of assets, may not amount to 
 
47 Regarding force majeure, Art. 7.1.7(1) UNIDROIT PICC; Art. 8:808(1) PECL; Art. 
III – 3:104(1) DCFR are practically identical to Article 79(1); Art. 89 PLACL. The same 
holds true for the ICC Force Majeure Clause. However, the latter gives a list of events 
that may amount to an impediment. 
48 McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.1', at 812, para. 1; Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1135, para 15. 
49 Article 6:111(2) PECL; Article III – 1:110(2) DCTR; ICC Hardship Clause 2003 para. 
2(a); ICC Hardship Clause 2020 para. 2(a); Art. 84(1) PLACL. 
50 Art. 84(1) PLACL. 
51 Article 6.2.2 UNIDROIT PICC; See McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 824, para.2. 
52 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1136, 37, paras. 17, 18. 
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an impediment beyond control since according to trade usages, such 
events are part of an organization’s sphere of risks.53 
HARDSHIP AS AN UNFORESEEABLE EVENT: 
4.5 Hardship, as a type of impediment,54 can only exempt the 
disadvantaged party from liability if the event causing the imbalance could 
not reasonably have been taken into account by that party at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract.55 If the events could have been foreseen, 
then it must be assumed that the disadvantaged party has taken the risk, 
unless such risk is contractually allocated to the other party.56 
4.6 In the case of drastic price increase due to market fluctuations, a 
look at historic price movements during a reasonable past period 
(pursuant to the Eisenberg formula57) may determine whether, under “a 
reasonable expectation test” the disadvantaged party could have foreseen 
the price increase leading to the hardship situation.58 This information 
could also help in assessing whether or not that party could have impliedly 
assumed the risk of a price increase in the market concerned. Courts and 
arbitral tribunals applying the CISG have considered that events leading 
to the value alteration in some commodities are part of the risk assumed 
by the buyer and thus, foreseeable.59 
 
53 Ibid., at 1138, para. 19. 
54 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 421.: “It has been seen above that the requirements 
of the force majeure and hardship exemptions are essentially the same, with the only 
qualification that the latter’s scope is limited to those ‘impediments’ or events which 
‘fundamentally alter the equilibrium of the contract’. See also Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1089, 
para. 81.: “the prerequisites of hardship can be deduced by way of analogy from Art. 
79(1) since both concepts aim at solving parallel problems”. 
55 McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 817, para. 12; Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales 
and Contract Law at 672, para. 45.107; Clayton P. Gillette and Steven D. Walt, The UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016) at 310; Dimatteo, International Contracting: Law and Practice at 265, para. 7.23. 
Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1089, para. 81. 
56 Gillette and Walt, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods at 310; 
Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1089, para. 81; Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General 
Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 398. 
57 Melvin A. Eisenberg, 'Impossibility, Impractiability, and Frustration', Journal of Legal 
Analysis, 1/1 (2009) at 245. 
58 Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract 
through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying 
Something', at 374, 77. 
59 France Cass civ 1ère, 30 June 2004, CISG–online Case No. 870 (Goods involved: cases 
made from polyurethane foam); Rechtbank van Koophandel, Tongeren, 25 January 2005, No 




HARDSHIP AS AN EVENT THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED OR OVERCOME: 
4.7 The impediment must be one that cannot reasonably be avoided 
or overcome.60  
4.8 Whether a party can be expected to overcome an economic 
impediment has to be decided by taking the threshold for hardship into 
account. If the increase in costs does not exceed the relevant threshold, 
the disadvantaged party may be obliged to make a higher sacrifice. For 
example, the seller may have to turn to another supplier or consider 
alternative possibilities for the transportation of the goods. 
2.5. SUCH HARDSHIP MAY ARISE WHEN THE COST OF PERFORMANCE HAS 
INCREASED OR THE VALUE OF THE PERFORMANCE HAS DIMINISHED 
5.1 Either an increase in the cost of performance or a decrease in the 
value of the performance received may give rise to hardship.61 This means 
that the disadvantaged party can be either the seller or the buyer. As 
pointed out by some authors, one may assume that a situation is unfair 
whenever “the supply of material need[ed] to manufacture certain goods 
unexpectedly becomes so reduced in quantity and inflated of price that 
only a minority of manufactures that require this material can continue 
production […]. Comparable unfairness can result if extreme and 
unexpected currency dislocations make it impossible for sellers to 
continue to produce or buyers to purchase”.62 The UNIDROIT PICC and 
PLACL expressly incorporate this double aspect of economic 
impediment.63 
2.6. SUCH HARDSHIP MAY ALSO ARISE FROM EVENTS OCCURRING 
BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT IF THE PARTIES DID 
NOT KNOW AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THESE EVENTS 
6.1 In cases of force majeure (objective impediments) under Article 79 
CISG, it is more or less unanimously held that it is irrelevant whether the 
 
1960, CISG-online Case No. 1106 (Goods involved: steel); Bulgarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 12 February 1998, CISG-online Case No. 436 (Goods involved: 
steel rope). 
60 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1089, para. 81; Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General 
Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 398; 
Schlechtriem and Butler, UN Law on International Sales at 201, para. 89. 
61 See Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for 
Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 221, 23. 
62 Honnold and Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales at 628, para. 432.2. 
63 Art. 6.2.2(1) UNIDROIT PICC and Art. 84(1) PLACL: “If after its conclusion, 
performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous or the utility of performance 
considerably decreases”. 
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impediment arose after the conclusion of the contract or if it already 
existed at the time of conclusion.64 If the specifically contracted goods had 
already been destroyed at the time of the conclusion of the contract, but 
the seller did not know about it nor could have prevented this fact, the 
seller may be exempted under Article 79(1) CISG. 
6.2 In cases of hardship, however, it has been argued that the 
changed circumstances must have occurred after the conclusion of the 
contract.65 This is the position taken by domestic legal systems.66 Similarly, 
the wording in international instruments is clearly based upon this 
assumption.67 Although the wording of Article 6.2.1 UNIDROIT PICC 
seems to point in the same direction,68 Article 6.2.2(a) PICC clarifies that 
hardship may be found if either the events that are causing the imbalance 
of the performances occur or if they become known to the disadvantaged 
party after the conclusion of the contract. Despite the wording of Art. 
6.2.2, some submit that the imbalance must necessarily occur after the 
conclusion of the contract.69 
6.3 Whether an initial gross imbalance between the performances of 
the parties, due to circumstances neither known to the parties nor 
avoidable, may amount to hardship under Article 79 CISG, one has to 
consider what other remedies the disadvantaged party could rely upon 
when discovering that, already at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, there had been a gross disparity between the respective values of 
the agreed obligations. Most likely under domestic laws, as well as under 
international soft law instruments, initial circumstances, such as gross 
 
64 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1134, para. 13; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1073, para. 48; Ferrari 
and Torsello, International Sales Law - CISG at 325; Schlechtriem and Butler, UN Law on 
International Sales at 202, para. 89. 
65 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 398, 99. 
66 Argentina Art. 1091 CC; Armenia Art. 467 CC; Austria §§ 936, 1052, 1170 a through 
analogy; Azerbaijan Art. 422 CC, Bolivia Art. 581(1)(4) CC; Brazil Art. 478, 479 CC; 
China Art. 26 PRC Contract Law Interpretation (2); Colombia Art. 868 Com C; Egypt: 
Art. 147(2) CC; Iraq Art. 146(2) CC; Kuwait 198 CC; France Art. 1195 CC; Germany § 
313 BGB; Italy Art. 1467 CC; Greece Art 388 CC; Netherlands Art. 6:258 Civil Code 
(BW); Portugal Art. 437 CC;: Libya: Art. 147(2); Lithuania: Art. 6.204 CC; Paraguay: Art. 
672 CC; Qatar Art. 171 (2); Russia: Art. 451(2) CC; Slovenia: Art. 112 CO; Syria: Art. 
148(2) CC; Taiwan: Art. 227-2 CC; Ukraine: Art. 652 CC See the position in most systems 
in Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 669, para. 45.96 et seq. 
67 See Art.6:111 PECL, Comment B (ii). Art. 6.2.1 UNIDROIT PICC; Art. 84 PLACL 
(otherwise the applicable provision is Art. 85 Frustration PLACL). 
68 Art. 6.2.1 UNIDROIT PICC: "Where the performance … becomes more onerous …" 
(emphasis added). 
69 See McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 817, para. 10. 




disparity between the parties’ performances, will give rise to remedies for 
mistake.70 These coexisting remedies may be tolerated within one single 
legal system; difficult problems, however, can arise when dealing with sales 
contracts under the CISG.71  
6.4 As it is debated whether the CISG contains a provision on 
mistake, and if so to what extent, this question would have to be resolved 
relying on the otherwise applicable domestic law.72 However, this may well 
lead to unpredictable results. For example, it might be questionable at 
what point in time production costs rose, be it before the conclusion of 
the contract or only afterwards. Furthermore, uniformity in such an 
important area of the sales law would be endangered by applying domestic 
rules on mistake to this question. It is exactly these considerations that, in 
the case of force majeure, compel the same treatment for initial and 
subsequent impediments.73 Thus, if the goods have been destroyed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract, domestic rules declaring such a 
contract as being void are excluded.74 The same reasoning should apply in 
cases of hardship. The CISG notion of hardship or economic impediment 
should be interpreted and understood in the broadest sense, 
encompassing any change of circumstances after the conclusion of the 
contract, as well as initial circumstances rendering performance 
excessively onerous.75 
 
70 Mm Van Rossum and J Hijma, 'Validity', in E.H. Hondius D. Busch, H.J. Van Kooten, 
H.N. Schelhaas, W.M. Schrama (ed.), The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law. 
A Commentary (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002) at 193; Restatement on the Law of 
Contracts § 266 ("Existing Impracticability or Frustration"). The same solution is 
proposed by McKendrick under UNIDROIT PICC see McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 
817, para. 10.: “When the event occurs prior to the conclusion of the contract, the 
affected party may be able to avoid the contract on the ground of mistake”. 
71 Patrick C. Leyens, 'CISG and Mistake, Uniform Law Vs. Domestic Law : The 
Interpretative Challenge of Mistake and the Validity Loophole', in Pace International Law 
Review (ed.), Review on the Convention for the International Sale of Goods 2002-2003 (Munich: 
Sellier, 2005) at 15. 
72 It is argued that a party can rely on mistake where the CISG and the domestic law 
provide the same remedies. For a detailed discussion about this matter see ibid., at 34; 
Stefan Kröll, 'Selected Problems Concerning the CISG's Scope of Application', Journal of 
Law and Commerce, 25 (2005) at 55. 
73 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1134, para. 13. 
74 Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 670, para. 45.98. 
75 Ibid. 
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2.7. IN ASSESSING WHETHER HARDSHIP EXISTS THE FOLLOWING 
NONEXCLUSIVE FACTORS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 
a. whether the risk of a change of circumstances was 
assumed by either party; 
b. whether the contract is of a speculative nature; 
c. whether and to what extent there have been previous 
market fluctuations; 
d. the duration of the contract; 
e. whether the seller has obtained the goods from its own 
supplier; 
f. whether either party has hedged against market changes. 
7.1 There is no fixed threshold for giving rise to a hardship excuse 
under Article 79 CISG. This has been recognized by other international 
instruments. For example, the comments to Article 6.2.2 UNIDROIT 
PICC,76 in its first edition of 1994 suggested that an alteration amounting 
to 50% or more would likely amount to a “fundamental” alteration, but 
the 2004, 2010 and 2016 UNIDROIT PICC editions, as well as other 
uniform law projects,77 refrain from recommending any exact figure.78 
7.2 Relying on a thorough comparative analysis of domestic 
solutions, one author has suggested that, as a general rule of thumb in 
standard situations, a threshold of at least 100% should be favored.79 
However, most decisions dealing with hardship under Article 79 
concluded that even a price increase or decrease of 100% would not 
suffice.80 
7.3 Even apparent excessive increases or decreases in the value of 
parties’ performances may not render the contract economically 
impossible in some scenarios.81 The price for the goods purported to be 
incorporated by the buyer into a final product could have doubled after 
the conclusion of the contract, but just before the seller had bought such 
 
76 McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 816, para. 8. 
77 Art.6:111 PECL; Art. 6.2.3 UNIDROIT PICC; Section III- 1:110 DCFR; Art. 84(1) 
PLACL. 
78 McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 816, para. 8. 
79 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 428-35. 
80 CIETAC, 2 May 1996, CISG–online Case No. 1067 (based on frustration); RB Hasselt, 
2 May 1995, CISG–online Case No. 371; CA Colmar, 12 June 2001, CISG–online Case 
No. 694 (the buyer failed to prove the 50% fall in the selling price of the goods, the 
[Buyer] does not prove the state of "necessity" which would allow it to terminate the 
contract). 
81 Gillette and Walt, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods at 312. 




inputs from a third party. If the price of the buyer’s final product has been 
proportionally augmented, either as a consequence of an increase in the 
input’s price or a sudden increase of its demand in the relevant 
marketplace, the hardship event may not have been the cause of a 
substantial alteration in the equilibrium of the contract. Assuming that a 
disruption of such “equilibrium” entails consequences for both parties, 
hardship is excluded in this case as long as the buyer had not a previous 
contract with a costumer, a cost increase to the seller not having a 
predictable effect on the buyer.82 
7.4 In order to determine whether a party may be expected to 
overcome a situation of hardship one may resort to “reasonable 
expectation test”.83  Under this test, a party may be exempted under Article 
79 CISG in case the performance, though technically possible, calls for 
spending huge costs, grossly disproportionate to the value of the 
obligation. In such a case, the aggrieved party may be exempted under 
Article 79 CISG as long it established that the financial loss it will suffer 
is significantly greater than the risk of loss a “reasonable person” is 
expected to assume at the time of the formation of the contract.84 In the 
case of devalued currency, it is suggested that if the parties were aware that 
the contract was one for a fixed valuation, the failing party should be 
exempted because that is what the parties intended, thus, expected.85 That 
being said, unless otherwise agreed, the reasonable expectations of the 
parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract are that the seller 
covers the risk against falling prices while assuming the risk that prices will 
increase. Conversely, it is to be expected that, unless otherwise agreed, the 
buyer covers against the risk of raising prices, while assuming the risk that 
market prices may decline after the conclusion of the contract.86  
7.5 In ascertaining whether any alteration amounts to hardship, 
primary consideration is to be given to the circumstances of the individual 
case. The following non-exclusive elements may be taken into account. 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ishida, 'Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract through 
Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying Something', at 
367, 68. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., at 371, 72. 
86 John Y. Gotanda, 'Dodging Windfalls: Damages Based on Market Price, Actual Loss, 
and Appropriate Awards ', in Villanova University (ed.), Villanova Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series (2015) at 6., available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683525. 
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WHETHER THE RISK OF A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WAS 
ASSUMED BY EITHER PARTY: 
7.6 As commented above, the parties may allocate in their contract 
the risk for a fundamental change of circumstances.87 Contract 
interpretation through Article 8 CISG is paramount in determining 
whether a party may rely on hardship or not. The choice of an Incoterms 
rule determines the point of delivery and places the risk as regards 
transport, export or import control, tariffs, etc. on one of the parties. 
Despite such allocation of risks and duties, a party might prove that 
delivery or performance of other obligations under an Incoterms or 
contract clause have been affected by an impediment that complies with 
the requirements of Article 79 CISG. Prior practices between the parties 
or international usages under Article 9 CISG, may integrate the contract 
in this matter. 
WHETHER THE CONTRACT IS OF A SPECULATIVE NATURE: 
7.7 If the contract is highly speculative, a party may be presumed to 
have assumed the risk involved in the transaction.88 A German court of 
second instance did not exempt a seller from liability under Article 79 
CISG even though the market price for the contract item, iron 
molybdenum from China, had risen by 300%.89 The court reasoned that 
in a trade sector, with highly speculative traits, the threshold for allowing 
hardship should be raised.90  
 
87 See Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for 
Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 147, 48. Katz, 'Remedies for Breach of 
Contract under the CISG', at 391; CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for 
Damages Under Article 79 of the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 
2007, Comment para. 39; McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 818, para. 15.: “assumption of 
risk need not to be express; it can be inferred from the circumstances or from the nature 
of the contact”. 
88 ICC Award, 26 August 1989, No 6281, CISG-online Case No. 8; Rechtbank van 
Koophandel, Tongeren, 25 January 2005, No 1960, CISG-online Case No. 1106. See also 
Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 220. McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 816, para. 8.: 
“the threshold is likely to be higher where the parties have entered into a highly 
speculative contract or the contract has been concluded in a market that is highly 
volatile”. 
89 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, No 167, CISG-online Case No. 261. 
90 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 28 February 1997, No 167, CISG-online Case No. 261. 




7.8 Other courts and arbitral tribunals have held that, in cases of 
speculative transactions, a party may have to accept even a tripled market 
price.91 
WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THERE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUS 
MARKET FLUCTUATIONS: 
7.9 Courts and arbitral tribunals interpreting Article 79(1) CISG have 
been very reluctant to exempt a party affected by fluctuations of prices.92 
As such, typical fluctuations of price in the commodity trade generally will 
not give rise to an acknowledgement of hardship.93 
7.10 However, in 2009 the Cour de Cassation of Belgium overturned 
the earlier decision of an appeal court in dealing with economic hardship.94 
In this case, the price of the steel sold unexpectedly rose by about 70%. 
The appellate court decided that the issue regarding economic hardship 
was not dealt with by the CISG, applying French domestic law in allowing 
the seller’s counterclaim for an amount based on a higher price.95 The Cour 
de Cassation rejected the application of French domestic law, holding that 
there was an internal gap in the CISG (Article 7(2)) to be filled by the 
general principles of international trade. Where a party invokes change in 
circumstances fundamentally disrupting the contractual equilibrium, the 
Belgian highest court held that one of those principles are to be found in 
the UNIDROIT PICC, and entitled said party to request re-negotiation of 
the contract.96 
 
91 OLG Hamburg, 28 February 1997, CISG–online Case No. 261; ICC Ct Arb No. 6281, 
26 august 1989,CISG-online Case No. 8 (a price increase of 13.16% is not 
enough)Tribunale Civile di Monza, 14 January 1993, CISG-online Case No. 540 (a price 
increase of 43.71% is not enough, but applying Italian domestic law: Article 1467 CC)  
92 Price fluctuations are considered foreseeable by most courts and arbitral tribunals: see 
RB Tongeren, 25 January 2005, CISG–online Case No. 1106; France Cass civ 1ère, 30 
June 2004, CISG–online Case No. 870; CA Colmar, 12 June 2001, CISG–online Case 
No. 694 (the buyer failed to prove the 50% fall in the selling price of the goods, the 
[Buyer] does not prove the state of "necessity" which would allow it to terminate the 
contract)); Int Ct Bulgarian CCI, 12 February 1998, CISG–online Case No. 436; RB 
Hasselt, 2 May 1995, CISG–online Case No. 371; ICC Ct Arb No. 6281, 26 august 1989, 
CISG–online Case No. 8 (it refers to price increase but the applicable law is Yugoslavian 
Law); Tribunale Civile di Monza, 14 Jan 1993, CISG-online Case No. 540 (the applicable 
law was the Italian CC: Article 1467 of the Civil Code). 
93 Schlechtriem and Butler, UN Law on International Sales at 204, para7.1.3; Gillette and 
Walt, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods at 312. 
94 See Hof van Cassatie, 19 June 2009, CISG-online Case No. 1963. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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7.11 Although this decision is welcomed for discarding the 
application of domestic law provisions on hardship over the CISG, it has 
been criticized for its low standard of value alteration and the application 
of the UNIDROIT PICC to fill in a CISG gap that does not exist (see 
para. 0 below).97 
THE DURATION OF THE CONTRACT: 
7.12 The time factor causes that hardship events are more likely to 
occur in some long-term contracts.98 However, in principle, the same 
standard should apply irrespective of the duration of contracts. 
7.13 A lower threshold of alteration in the parties’ performance may 
only apply in contracts of extended duration if the disadvantaged party’s 
financial ruin is imminent.99 In this regard, the point in time when the 
hardship event takes place is relevant to calculate the value of the 
outstanding performances with respect to the total contract value.100 For 
example, if the value of a ten year contract is forecasted by the 
disadvantaged party at 100%, and the hardship events took place during 
the fifth year resulting in that party receiving 30% of the forecasted value, 
the adjudicator should consider the remaining 70% forecasted value for 
the next five years while assessing whether the parties’ performances have 
suffered a fundamental disequilibrium.  
WHETHER THE SELLER HAS OBTAINED THE GOODS FROM ITS OWN 
SUPPLIER: 
7.14 All circumstances affecting performance should be considered 
in determining whether a party might be exempted due to hardship. In 
some instances, the seller may have bought the goods or otherwise secured 
them from its supplier before the hardship event takes place. The price 
might have considerably and unforeseeably increased after that time, yet 
the contract might not be speculative in nature, however, if the seller 
receives the goods before the occurrence of the hardship event, the seller 
may not rightfully withhold delivery and resale the goods for a larger profit 
to a second buyer.  
 
97 See Flechtner, 'The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention Including 
Comments on Hardship Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian 
Cassation Court', at 98. 
98 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 438. 
99 Ibid., at 439. 
100 Ibid., at 462, 63. 




WHETHER EITHER PARTY HAS HEDGED AGAINST MARKET CHANGES: 
7.15 Whether any of the parties has hedged or secured against 
changes in the market should be considered in assessing the existence of 
hardship. For example, if a seller has bought insurance against hardship, 
the amount of such insurance may be considered in determining whether 
the seller can overcome the impediment or not.  
2.8.  THE PARTY AFFECTED BY HARDSHIP MUST GIVE NOTICE TO THE 
OTHER PARTY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND ITS EFFECT ON ITS 
ABILITY TO PERFORM. IF THE NOTICE IS NOT RECEIVED BY THE 
OTHER PARTY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PARTY 
AFFECTED KNEW OR OUGHT TO HAVE KNOWN OF THE HARDSHIP 
SITUATION, IT IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM SUCH NON-
RECEIPT 
8.1 Pursuant to Article 79(4) CISG, a party failing to perform shall 
provide timely notice of the impediment and its effect on his ability to 
perform.101 This requirement is an expression of the underlying principle 
of cooperation in CISG contracts; it is intended to alert the other party on 
whether it should itself take remedial action, reduced damages under 
Article 77 CISG and/or – when a fundamental breach exists – avoid the 
contract.102 This notice requirement applies to hardship situations and 
follows the same objectives as other types of impediments.103  
8.2 The notice must be given within a reasonable time after the party 
affected knew or ought to have known of the hardship. In order to fulfill 
its purpose, the notice must describe the changes in the economic 
circumstances, their gravity, nature and duration with sufficient detail.104 
Notice may have to be given in multiple stages, depending on the relevant 
market’s state (e.g. the degree of abruptness or fluctuation in the 
obligation’s value) or the nature of the impediment turning the 
performance excessively onerous. Whether notice is given within a 
reasonable time depends on the circumstances and the parties’ agreement, 
 
101 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of 
the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Comment para. 1. 
102 Yesim M. Atamer, 'Article 79', in Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis, and Pilar Perales 
Viscasillas (eds.), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods - Commetary 
(Second edn; München: Hart Publishing, 2018) at 1077, para. 95; Brunner, Force Majeure 
and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International 
Arbitration at 342. 
103 Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 672, para. 45.108. 
104 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1147, para. 45; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1077, para. 95; 
Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 342. 
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such as the means available or possibility to transmit the notice and 
whether the performance on time was of the essence.105 
8.3 The notice is not subject to any form requirements. Unlike 
Article 27 CISG, under Article 79(4) CISG the risk that the notice fails to 
reach the addressee within a reasonable time is placed on the party affected 
by hardship.106 However, a teleological reading of this provision, in light 
of the principle of good faith in Article 7(1) CISG), may exempt the 
aggrieved party from the obligation to give notice if the other party was 
aware of the relevant circumstances.107  
8.4 A party’s failure to give notice does not preclude it from invoking 
the exemption under Article 79 CISG. The general exemption from 
damages in Article 79(5) CISG remains unaffected. The consequences of 
a failure to give proper and timely notice of the hardship situation is 
liability for losses resulting from it. The other party could claim its reliance 
losses. These might consist of, for example, expenses incurred in reliance 
that the contract would be performed during the time within which the 
notice should have been received.108 Lost profits may also lie in the case 
of late delivery affected by hardship if the buyer resells the goods to a third 
party after the expiration of the time when notice should have been 
received by the buyer.109 
2.9. IN CASE OF HARDSHIP, NOTHING PREVENTS EITHER PARTY FROM 
EXERCISING ANY RIGHT OTHER THAN TO CLAIM DAMAGES AND 
REQUIRE PERFORMANCE OF THE OBLIGATION AFFECTED BY 
HARDSHIP 
9.1 Article 79(5) CISG relieves the disadvantaged party only from 
the obligation to pay damages.110 Other CISG principles, including 
reasonableness of performance (Articles 46 and 48 CISG) and the need to 
interpret the remedies available to the parties in good faith (Article 7(1) 
CISG)111 may also have an impact on releasing the disadvantaged party 
from its obligation to perform the contract while the impediment exists. 
 
105 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 343. 
106 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1077, para. 96. 
107 In relation to impediments in general see, Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1147, para. 47. 
108 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1077, para. 97. 
109 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 343. 
110 Flechtner, 'Uniformity and Politics: Interpreting and Filling Gaps in the CISG', at 201. 
111 Diana Akikol, 'Article 46', in Brunner and Gottlieb (ed.), Commentary on the UN Sales 
Law (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2019) at 348, para. 14; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 
1053, para. 39. 




Among the remedies not affected by an exemption under Article 79 CISG 
are the other party’s right to suspend performance (Art. 71 CISG), reduce 
the contract price (Art. 50), avoid the contract (Arts. 48(1) and 64(1) 
CISG) or any of its instalments (Art. 73 CISG), claim interest (Art. 78 
CISG) or expenses incurred in the preservation of the goods (Arts. 85 and 
86 CISG).112  
2.9.1.EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY IN DAMAGES: 
9.2 As stated in CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, if the non-performance is 
due to an impediment under Article 79 CISG, the disadvantaged party is 
relieved, first and foremost, from its obligation to pay damages during the 
time such impediment exists.113 The same damages exemption should 
follow from a court’s or arbitral tribunal’s determination of hardship.114 As 
 
112 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1151, para. 56; Honnold and Flechtner, Uniform Law for 
International Sales at 640, para. 435.4; Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General 
Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 366.  
113 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of 
the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro,  12 Oct 2007, Rule 1. Comment para. 
6; Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 345; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1060, para.13; 
Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1148, para. 50; Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and 
Contract Law at 663, para. 45.60. One author asserts that express exemption to pay 
damages was not necessary because an impediment under article 79 CISG would fall 
under the category of unforeseeable damages under 74 CISG, see Ishida, 'CISG Article 
79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract through Interpretation of 
Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying Something', at 340. However, 
Ishida seems to miss the point that the foreseeability requirement in Article 74 CISG 
regards the damages as a possible consequence of the breach rather than the breach itself 
or the impediment causing the latter. He also forgets that the CISG remedies system 
follows the strict liability approach and that Article 79 works as an exoneration of liability 
rather than a damages’ limitation provision. 
114 Regarding the UNIDROIT PICC some authors seem to have a different view. 
Commenting Article 6.2.3 PICC, McKendrick considers that hardship does not in itself 
exclude the defendant’s liability for non-performance, see McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.3', at 
821, para. 10. He cites a CAM Arbitral Award, holding that Article 6.2.3 PICC does not 
provide the remedy of damages’ exemption but a duty to renegotiate, the remedy of 
contract adaptation or termination by the Tribunal; and since the breaching party did not 
request any of those remedies, the Tribunal decided not to exempt it from damages, 
skipping a determination of whether hardship had taken place. In spite of such incorrect 
understanding, it seems clear that once hardship is found and a court or tribunal decides 
to adapt a contract or terminate it upon a party’s request, the latter should be exempted 
to pay any damages arising out of the contract modification or termination, see 
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stated in CISG-AC Opinion No. 10, the exemption from paying damages 
under Article 79 CISG includes an exemption to pay the so-called “agreed 
sums”, i.e. penalty clauses or liquidated damages (if they are at all valid 
under the governing domestic law), unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise in their contract.115  
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE EXCLUDED: 
9.3 Whether the exemption under Article 79 CISG also extends to 
the right to request performance has been a subject of considerable debate 
because of the wording of Article 79(5) CISG.116 This provision states that 
nothing prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim 
damages under this Convention.117 The wording of 79(5) CISG would 
suggest that a party to the contract may claim, in principle, specific 
performance in spite of the impediment endured by the other. At the 
Vienna Conference, a proposal by the German delegation aimed at 
clarifying that performance could not be insisted on in case of a continued 
impediment was rejected.118 It was considered that no problem would arise 
in practice in case the disadvantaged party suffered actual impediments, 
whereas the categorical removal of the right to performance could impair 
the accessory rights of the other party.119 Nowadays it seems to be 
undisputed that performance cannot be demanded as long as the 
 
Arbitral Award of 30 November 2006, Centro de Arbitraje de México, paragraph 251, 
available at Unilex 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1149&step=FullText 
115 CISG-AC Opinion No. 10, Agreed Sums Payable upon Breach of an Obligation in 
CISG Contracts, Rapporteur: Dr. Pascal Hachem, (2012), Rule 5. See also Hachem, 
Agreed Sums Payable Upon Breach of an Obligations at 138; Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship 
under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 
346, 47. 
116 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1061, paras. 16, 17; Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1050, para. 53. 
117 Article 8:101(2) PECL clearly states that where a party’s non-performance is excused, 
alongside with the right to claim damages, the right to performance is likewise excluded. 
See Article 8:101 PECL “(2) Where a party's non-performance is excused under Article 
8:108, the aggrieved party may resort to any of the remedies set out in Chapter 9 except 
claiming performance and damages”. 
118 Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract 
through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying 
Something', at 343, 44. 
119 See Document A/CONF.97/C.1/L.191/Rev.1 in United Nations Conference on 
Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 10 March-11 April 1980 (Official 
Records, New York, 1981) 381. Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1050, para. 53. 




impediment exists.120 The same consequences should follow in case of 
hardship, which is a type of impediment.121 
9.4 The exemption to perform due to hardship applies to the 
obligation to perform the contract under Articles 46(1) and 62 CISG, to 
deliver substitute goods under Article 46(2) CISG and to cure any non-
conformity of the goods by repair under Article 46(3) CISG.122 The same 
reasoning appears in other international instruments, such as Article 
7.2.2(b) UNIDROIT PICC.123 The rule may be drawn from the possibility 
to request performance unless it is unreasonable under Articles 46 and 48 
CISG in light of the obligation to interpret the CISG in good faith under 
Article 7(1) CISG.124 
SUSPENSION OF PERFORMANCE: 
9.5 A party has the right to suspend performance of its obligation if, 
after the conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other 
party will not perform a substantial part of its obligations. Article 
71(1)(a)(b) CISG does not expressly mention hardship among the grounds 
for suspension, but the disadvantaged party’s “serious deficiency in his 
ability to perform” under Article 71(1)(a) CISG might encompass 
impediments like hardship.  
9.6 Article 71 CISG restricts the right to suspension or stoppage in 
transit to situations in which performance has not yet become due. 
Nevertheless, a party may withhold its performance when an obligation 
has become due and there is an impediment under Article 79 CISG 
preventing the seller from delivering the goods or the buyer from paying 
 
120 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1065, para. 27; Honnold and Flechtner, Uniform Law for 
International Sales at 642, para. 435.5; Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, 
and Adaptation of Contract through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound 
and Fury, but Signifying Something', at 449-51; Peter Huber, 'Article 46', in Mistelis, Kröll 
and Perales-Viscasillas (ed.), UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(Hamburg: Beck, 2018) at 678, para. 19. 
121 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1150, 51, para. 55; Huber, 'Article 46', at 879, para. 23; 
Akikol, 'Article 46', at 348, 49, para. 14; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1052, para. 35. 
122 Akikol, 'Article 46', at 348, para. 14; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1053, para. 39. 
123 Article 7.2.2 UNIDROIT PICC: Where a party who owes an obligation other than 
one to pay money does not perform, the other party may require performance, unless: 
[...] 
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive; 
[...] 
124 Akikol, 'Article 46', at 348, para. 14; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1053, para. 39. 
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the purchase price. A proper notice of hardship by the disadvantaged party 
will allow the other party to withhold performance of its obligations and, 
thus, avoid further losses.  
PRICE REDUCTION: 
9.7 Article 50 CISG entitles the buyer to reduce the price of non-
conforming goods in the same proportion as the value that conforming 
goods have at the time of delivery. A hardship exemption under Article 79 
CISG can rarely occur when the non-conforming goods have already been 
delivered. However, a buyer may claim price reduction if, for example, the 
non-conformity consists in missing parts of the goods that the seller is 
unable to deliver due to hardship. 
AVOIDANCE BY A PARTY’S DECLARATION: 
9.8 The right to avoid the contract under Articles 49(1) and 64(1) 
CISG presupposes that the non-performance amounts to a fundamental 
breach of contract. Whether such a fundamental breach exists largely 
depends upon the circumstances of the individual case.125 Article 25 CISG 
circumscribes a fundamental breach of contract as the non-performance 
resulting in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive it 
of what it is entitled to expect under the contract.126 One of the central 
questions in hardship cases is whether it is possible and –having regard to 
the other party’s expectations – just and reasonable that the breach be 
remedied.127  
9.9 In the hypothetical case where, after the conclusion of the 
contract, the acquisition costs for the seller have doubled from 100 to 200, 
the seller may propose delivering the goods if the buyer is willing to pay a 
higher purchase price, let us say 150. The buyer may opt for refusing to 
accept the seller’s offer, proceed to a cover purchase and sue the seller for 
100 (the difference between the contract price and the price of the 
substitute purchase). The court or arbitral tribunal should then have to 
decide whether the seller is exempted from its obligations due to hardship 
 
125 Ulrich Schroeter, 'Article 25', in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (4th edn; London: OUP, 
2016) at 424, paras. 13 et seq. Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 12 March 2001, CISG-online 
Case No. 841; CIETAC, 30 October 1991, CISG-online Case No. 842. 
126 Similar provision is Article 7.3.1(2) UNIDROIT PICC, Article 8:103 PECL and 
Article III – 3:502(2) DCFR. 
127 CISG AC Opinion No. 5, The buyer's right to avoid the contract in case of non-
conforming goods or documents Rapporteur: Professor Ingeborg Schwenzer, 7 May 
2005, Comment 3. 




or whether the seller´s willingness to deliver the goods on different terms 
(at 150) amounted to a fundamental breach of contract, giving the buyer 
the right to avoid the contract. The court here will have to consider 
whether, under the circumstances of the case, it would have been just and 
reasonable for the buyer to pay 150 (which the seller was willing to accept) 
rather than 200 (in a substitute transaction). Giving due regard to all 
circumstances, the court or tribunal might find for the seller if it considers 
that the buyer should have consented to renegotiate the price in order to 
mitigate its loss. 
RIGHT TO CLAIM INTEREST: 
9.10 A buyer that has delayed payment of the purchase price due to 
a temporary hardship situation under Article 79 CISG, shall pay interest 
on it as of the date of payment agreed in the contract.128 The rule applies 
to any monetary obligation that has not been paid timely due to hardship, 
unless delay has been caused by the other party’s conduct.129 
2.10. THE EXEMPTION DUE TO HARDSHIP HAS EFFECT FOR THE PERIOD 
DURING WHICH HARDSHIP EXISTS. 
10.1 A claim for specific performance under the original terms of the 
contract (Articles 46(1) and 62 CISG) will not be enforceable as long as 
the substantial disequilibrium in the party’s performances persists.130 
Neither an obligation to deliver substitute goods (Article 46(2) CISG) nor 
an obligation to cure any non-conformity of the goods by repair (Article 
46(3) CISG) may be enforced against the disadvantage party during the 
time where hardship exists.131  
2.11. UNDER THE CISG, THE PARTIES HAVE NO DUTY TO RENEGOTIATE 
THE CONTRACT IN CASE OF HARDSHIP. 
11.1 Parties may, if they agree to do so, renegotiate their contract in 
case of hardship. Renegotiation of the terms of the contract is the most 
rational solution in some hardship cases and in others the most practical 
solution. If the parties voluntarily renegotiate, they could address any 
market or value distortion in a faster and efficient manner. CISG case law 
 
128 CISG-AC Opinion No. 14, Interest under Article 78 CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Dr 
Yeşim M. Atamer, 22 October 2013), Rule 7, Comment paras. 3.47 and 3.48. 
129 Id., Comment, para. 3.47. 
130 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1150, 51, para. 55; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1068, paras. 35, 
36; Akikol, 'Article 46', at 349, para. 15. 
131 Akikol, 'Article 46', at 348, para. 14; Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1053, para. 39. 
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shows that parties try to solve different issues amicably, before claiming 
any remedies under the Convention.132  
11.2 Renegotiation, however, as negotiation, is based on willingness 
and trust. Constructive and cooperative renegotiation cannot be forced 
upon the parties by coercion.133 The parties’ freedom to modify their 
contract is the primary source for a new balance between the parties’ 
obligations. The possibility of having a contract rebalanced by common 
agreement primarily rests on the parties’ freedom to agree, beforehand, on 
which steps to take in case of hardship. Different model hardship clauses 
state such possibility,134 including the ICC Hardship Clause 2003 and 
2020.135  
11.3 In addition, there are factual incentives for the parties to 
renegotiate their contract in a hardship situation, in their best interests 
under the current system of CISG remedies. The traditional remedies 
under the CISG, in combination with the duty to mitigate any loss in 
Article 77 CISG,136 may induce the parties to renegotiate their obligations 
and to distribute risks evenly in the uncertainty brought by every hardship 
situation.137  
 
132 Hannaford (trading as Torrens Valley Orchards) v Australian Farmlink Pty Ltd ACN 
087 011 541 [2008] FCA 1591, 24 October 2008, Unilex case no. 1366 available at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1366; ICC Arbitration Case No. 11849 of 2003 
(Fashion products case), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031849i1.html; 
Republic of Korea 29 April 2010 Daegu District Court, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100429k3.html.  
133 Günter Roth, ' § 313 Bgb', in Wolfgang Krüger (ed.), Münchener Kommentar Zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (5 edn; Muchen: CH Beck, 2007) at para. 93. 
134 See for example, Clause 16.2 (Hardship) of Standard Model Contract for International 
Commercial Sale of Goods and Clauses 9.2 and 9.3 of the International Long-Term 
Supply of Goods, by the International Trade Center (an agency of the World Trade 
Organization): (Itc), Model Contracts for Small Firms: Legal Guidance for Doing International 
Business at 54, 55, 70, 71., available at 
http://www.intracen.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=37603. 
135 See ICC Hardship Clause 2003, para. (2)(b); ICC Hardship Clause 2020, para. (2)(b). 
136 See Ingeborg Schwenzer and Simon Manner, 'The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: The 
Impact of the Non- Breaching Party's (Non) Behaviour on Its CISG-Remedies', in 
Camilla Andersen and Ulrich Schroeter (eds.), Sharing International Commercial Law across 
National Boundaries – Festschrift for Albert H Kritzer ( London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 
2008) at 480. For the duty to mitigate in domestic legal systems see Schwenzer, Hachem, 
and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 630, para. 44.256 et seq. Also see Finland § 70(1) 
Sale of Goods Act; Germany § 254 BGB; Norway § 70(1) Sale of Goods Act; Sweden § 
70(1) Sale of Goods Act; Switzerland Art. 44 CO; Arts. 7.4.7, 7.4.8 UNIDROIT PICC, 
Articles 9:504 and 9:505 PECL; Arts. III.-3:704 and III.-3:705 DCFR.  
137 Article 77 CISG can clearly constitute a rule for a fair distribution of risks in case of 
hardship despite the contrary opinion of some scholars, see Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1091, 
para. 85. Buyers will not automatically reject an offer to renegotiate, avoid the contract 




11.4 In comments to the CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, the question 
whether the parties may have a duty to renegotiate based upon the 
mandate to interpret the CISG in good faith (Article 7(1) CISG) was posed 
without further elaboration.138 This Opinion No. 20 clarifies that, unless 
otherwise indicated in the contract, the CISG does not impose upon the 
parties an obligation to renegotiate the contract in case of hardship.  
11.5 A duty to renegotiate that operates as a CISG default rule would 
not be suitable. An impediment under Article 79 CISG only releases the 
party in breach from the obligation to compensate any damages resulting 
such breach.139 There is no duty to renegotiate under Article 79 CISG, and 
the impracticability associated with enforcing such a duty makes it 
advisable not to impose it.  
11.6 First, it is more than questionable whether and how the breach 
of an obligation to renegotiate would be redressed. Article 79 CISG, like 
most domestic and international legal systems, does not stipulate any 
means to enforce the duty to renegotiate imposed upon the parties (see 0 
above).140 Imposing a duty to negotiate where there are no means of 
specific enforcement amounts to nothing more than a best practices 
declaration. The duty to negotiate would gain importance only if breaching 
it was sanctioned.141 
11.7 Second, cases of hardship involve fact situations in which it can 
hardly be determined whether a party refusing or breaking off negotiations 
acted in bad faith.142 Imposing renegotiation is especially unsuitable for 
 
and sue for damages in case of lack of delivery at the agreed price. The costs of bringing 
a claim and the uncertainty of the court’s decision may act as disincentives in long term 
distribution contracts or scenarios where the goods are to be integrated into a 
manufacturing process or to inventory waiting to be resold, especially at times where the 
hardship and related doctrines are gaining momentum in B2B transactions. In one case, 
for example, a court in the Netherlands held that a seller should have agreed on a change 
of delivery terms requested by the buyers, and ordered the seller to deliver the goods 
within 14 days after judgment, see Rechtbank Arnhem, 31 January 2008, CISG-online 
Case No. 2016.  
138 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of 
the CISG Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Comment para. 40. 
139 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1148, para. 50; Flechtner, 'Uniformity and Politics: 
Interpreting and Filling Gaps in the CISG', at 201. 
140 See for example, Armenia Art. 467 CC; Azerbaijan Art. 422 CC; France Art. 1195 CC; 
Lithuania Art. 5.204 CC; Russia Art. 451 CC; Ukraine Art. 652 CC. Also see Schwenzer, 
Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 673, para. 45.112. 
141 This is only envisaged by Article 6:111(3)(c) PECL, according to which a court may 
award damages for the loss suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off 
negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 
142 These criticisms were recognized by the drafters of the DCFR, who, according to the 
Official Comments, decided not to impose an obligation to negotiate (although, they 
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international transactions calling for promptness and legal certainty, which 
militate against lengthy or tedious negotiations.143 Parties resorting to the 
courts or arbitration are most likely to have exhausted their efforts to reach 
an amicable solution before getting involved in the costs and 
inconvenience of filing an action .144 Clear cases of bad faith, however, 
may be taken into account upon allocating the costs of proceedings.145 
11.8 For hardship cases, some international instruments provide an 
obligation to renegotiate the original contract terms that became 
imbalanced or excessively onerous.146 This duty to renegotiate rests on a 
duty to act in good faith,147 which is common to many civil law systems.148 
 
made an attempt at renegotiation a prerequisite to the obligor’s right to obtain relief), see 
Art. III.-1:110, Comment C DCFR. 
143 Atamer, 'Article 79', at 1091, para. 84. 
144 Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract 
through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying 
Something', at 372. 
145 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 483. 
146 Article 6.2.3(1) UNDROIT PICC, Article 6:111(2) PECL 1999 as well as Article III – 
1:110(3)(d) DCFR; Art. 84(1) PLACL. However, McKendrick explains that in the case 
of UNIDROIT PICC the duty to renegotiate does not come from the wording of Article 
6.2.3 (“entitled to request negotiations”) but from the general principle of good faith in 
Article 1.7 and the parties’ duty to co-operate under Article 5.1.3 PICC, see McKendrick, 
'Article 6.2.3', at 819, para. 1, fn. 53. 
147 Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-
Performance in International Arbitration at 480, 81; McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.3', at 819, para. 
1. See also ICC Award, March 1999, No 5953, Clunet 1990, 1056. 
148 The principle of good faith found its way into almost every Civil Law system through 
the reception of Roman law. See France Article 1104(1) CC; Italy Article 1337 CC; 
Germany § 242 BGB; Switzerland Article 2 ZGB. The new French civil code endorsed 
the principle in Article 1104(1), see Chénedé, Le Nouveau Droit Des Obligations Et Des 
Contrats: Consolidations - Innovations - Perspective at 19, para. 21.24. Good faith is also a 
contract integration principles engrained in Latin American laws, see Edgardo Muñoz, 
Modern Law of Contracts and Sales in Latin-America, Spain and Portugal, ed. Ingeborg 
Schwenzer (International Commerce and Arbitration, 6; The Hague: Eleven 
International Publishing, 2011) at 270. Common Law systems, however, tend to refrain 
from accepting good faith as a general principle of contract law: see Michael G. Bridge, 
'Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?', Canadian Bus LJ, 9 (1984) 
at 426; Gunther Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying 
Law Ends up in New Divergencies', Modern Law Review, 61 (1998) at 11.  




But other legal systems, not only those pertaining to the common law 
tradition,149 do not impose a duty to renegotiate.150  
11.9 The Belgium Cour de Cassation and some authors have 
considered that there is a gap in Article 79 CISG as far as the consequences 
of hardship are concerned and that this gap might be filled according to 
Article 7(2) CISG by relying on the UNIDROIT PICC, which requires the 
parties to renegotiate the contract.151 This approach poses some 
difficulties. It has been disputed that Article 7(1) CISG imposes an 
obligation upon the parties to act in good faith during their contract 
conclusion and performance.152 Besides, Article 7 CISG requires an 
autonomous interpretation and the filling in of internal gaps in accordance 
with its own principles. Thus, all solutions developed must be based on 
the Convention itself.153  
2.12. UNDER THE CISG, A COURT OR ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL MAY NOT 
ADAPT THE CONTRACT IN CASE OF HARDSHIP 
12.1 Adaptation is not contemplated or allowed under the CISG.154 
The fact that the CISG provisions governing exemption do not authorize 
contract adaptation by a court or arbitral tribunal, does not create a “gap” 
in the CISG; it rather shows a rejection of the adaptation remedy, as 
 
149 See United States § 2-615 (a) UCC stating that "[d]elay in delivery or non-delivery … 
is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been 
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency…." For a discussion of the 
impracticability doctrine in American law see, Palumbo, Modern Law of Sales in the United 
States at 165, 66. 
150 See Argentina Art. 1091 CC; Italy Arts. 1467-1469 CC; The Netherlands Arts. 6:258 
and 6:260 BW. See for further references, Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General 
Contract Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 480. 
151 Hof van Cassatie, 19 June 2009, CISG-online Case No. 1963; Schlechtriem and Butler, 
UN Law on International Sales at 204, para. 91. 
152 Bridge, The International Sale of Goods at 509, para. 10.41; Ingeborg Schwenzer and 
Pascal Hachem, 'Article 7', in Ingeborg Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (4th edn; London: OUP, 
2016) at 127, para. 17. 
153 Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 45, para. 3.54. 
154 Neither adaptation of the contract is contemplated in the following domestic laws: 
Italy Art. 1467 CC; Bolivia Art. 581 CC, Brazil Art. 478 and 479 CC; Slovenia Art. 112 
Code of Obligations. The ICC Hardship Clause 2003 states in para 3 that "… the party 
invoking this Clause is entitled to termination of the contract." On Article 1467 of the 
Italian Codice Civile, see Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles: 
Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration at 506. 
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recorded in the travaux préparatoires.155 Considering that hardship is a matter 
governed by the CISG, the remedies available for such type of impediment 
should be found in Article 79 CISG. In this regard, Article 79(5) CISG 
specifically states that the aggrieved party may exercise any right under the 
Convention except for damages. Consequently, this provision expressly 
sets out the remedies by reference to those explicitly stated in Articles 45 
and 61 CISG. Adaptation by a court or arbitral tribunal is not 
contemplated by those provisions.  
12.2 For the same reasons, no period of grace may be granted to the 
disadvantaged party in a situation of hardship when the other party is 
entitled to a remedy for breach of contract under the CISG (Articles 45(3) 
and 61(3) CISG). 
12.3 Moreover, it is not consistent or necessary to create a different 
legal remedy for economic impediments that differs from the remedy that 
already exists under Article 79 CISG. The solution envisaged by the 
remedy of contract adaptation takes out from of the parties’ hands what 
the latter may be able to achieve better. This approach contradicts the 
parties’ autonomy to fix the hardship situation. 
12.4 It has been advocated that Article 50 CISG, on reduction of the 
purchase price, evidences a general principle so as to adjust a contract to 
changed circumstances.156 However, the right to reduce the contract price 
in Article 50 CISG derives from a breach of contract incurred by the other 
party; in other words, it is the adverse consequence of a breach of contract 
and an efficient way to redress the damage caused by the breach. Granting 
price reduction does not depart from the parties’ initial expectations under 
the contract, whereas adaptation of the contract in case of hardship works 
against the party not responsible for the impediment.  
12.5 Furthermore, it has been suggested that adaptation may lie 
under a “reasonable expectation test”, proposed as another of the 
principles upon which the CISG is based (Article 7(2) CISG): a judge or 
an arbitrator first determines where a party could “reasonably” be 
expected to overcome an impediment and, if not, he or she may adapt the 
 
155 Flechtner, 'The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention Including Comments 
on Hardship Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court', at 
98. 
156 Schlechtriem, 'Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG 
Scholars Discuss Contract Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, 
Nachfrist, Contract Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much 
More by Harry M. Flechtner', (Adhering to Schlechtriem view see, Ishida, 'CISG Article 
79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract through Interpretation of 
Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying Something', at 378, 79. 




contract by ordering a solution “reasonably” expected to be taken.157 
Relying on Articles 39 and 60 CISG, which allow the integration of the 
contract, it has been submitted that courts may in some instances rewrite 
CISG contracts in light of the surrounding circumstances, trade usages or 
prior practices.158 However, the task of integrating a contract works under 
the assumption that the parties have not agreed otherwise, whereas 
adapting a contract calls for a departure from the original deal concluded 
by the parties. Adaptation of contractually agreed terms entails the exercise 
of extraordinary powers requiring an express provision in the CISG 
confirming such faculty for adjudicators.  
12.6 In the last Comment of the CISG Advisory Council’s Opinion 
No. 7, it is stated that in case negotiations fail, there are no guidelines 
under the Convention for a court or arbitrator to adjust, or revise the 
terms of the contract so as to restore the balance of the performances.159 
The same Comment also states that CISG Article 79(5) may be relied upon 
to open up the possibility for a court or arbitral tribunal to determine what 
is owed to each other, thus adapting the terms of the contract to the 
changed circumstances.160 As a party in arbitration proceeding pointed out, 
CISG Advisory Council’s statement did not suggest that the remedy of 
contract adaptation was contemplated in Article 79 CISG, because 
allowing a court or arbitral tribunal “to determine what is owed to each other” 
does not give the adjudicator the power to adjust a term of the contract.161 
12.7 Some authors have proposed to rely on Article 6.2.3(4) 
UNIDROIT PICC as constituting either a general principle upon which 
the CISG is based under Article 7(2) CISG162 or an international usage in 
the sense of Article 9(2) CISG in order to reach the desirable result of 
adaptation.163 That approach also poses some difficulties. First, as stated 
 
157 See Ishida, 'CISG Article 79: Exemption of Performance, and Adaptation of Contract 
through Interpretation of Reasonableness - Full of Sound and Fury, but Signifying 
Something', at 359, 72, 79, 80.  
158 See ibid.  
159 CISG AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of 
the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro Garro, 12 Oct 2007, Comment 3.2, para. 40. 
160 Ibid para. 40. 
161 Separate Award, SCC Arbitration No. V2014/078/080, 31 May 2017, CISG-online 
Case No.4683, para. 2568 as an argument of the Respondent (Gazprom) that the Arbitral 
Tribunal neither contradicted nor expressly accepted. 
162 Schlechtriem, 'Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG 
Scholars Discuss Contract Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, 
Nachfrist, Contract Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much 
More by Harry M. Flechtner', at 236, 37. 
163 Schlechtriem and Butler, UN Law on International Sales at 204, para. 91; Atamer, 'Article 
79', at 1091, 92, para. 86. 
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above, there is no gap in the CISG regarding the remedies in case of 
hardship. Second, although there might be an overlapping between certain 
trade usages and some of the provisions in the UNIDROIT PICC, the 
latter were not conceived as a restatement of international trade usages. 
The remedy of contract adaptation by an arbitral tribunal or court in case 
of hardship is contemplated in many civil law legal systems164 and at the 
international level too,165 but it is not internationally accepted.166 Whether 
adaptation of the contract or some of its clauses by a third party 
constitutes a usage in some industries must be established pursuant to 
Article 9(2) CISG. 
12.8 The situation may be different when the contract has already 
been fulfilled by one side. Thus, a buyer may have complied with its 
obligation to pay the price in a foreign currency of which the value, for 
example, increased by 100% since the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, resorting to an excessively onerous bank credit and placing its 
financial survival at peril. Commenting on the hardship provisions in the 
UNIDROIT PICC, it has been stated that a remedy for hardship must 
relate to obligations that remain to be performed, precluding a party from 
claiming greater payment for work already done.167 Yet, with few 
exceptions,168 most provisions on hardship do not clarify whether a party 
may be exempted from obligations that have already been performed.169 
Arguably, the text of hardship provisions excusing a party from 
performing, such as Article 79 CISG, may be interpreted against 
exempting liability for performance that has been already rendered, given 
that the very notion of impediment calls for events which “could not have 
been overcome”, past performance being an indication that the 
 
164 Argentina Art. 1091 CC; Armenia Art. 467 CC; Azerbaijan Art. 422 CC, Bolivia Art. 
581(1)(4) CC; China Art. 26 PRC Contract Law Interpretation (2) and Art. 227-2 CC; 
Colombia Art. 868 Com C; Croatia Art. 369 Civil Obligations Act; Egypt Art. 147(2) CC; 
France Art. 1195 CC; Germany § 313(1) BGB; Greece Art. 388 CC; Iraq Art. 146(2) CC; 
Kuwait 198 CC; Libya: Art. 147(2); Lithuania: Art. 6.204 CC; Montenegro Art. 128 Law 
on Obligations; Paraguay Art. 672 CC, only in unilateral contracts; Portugal Art. 437 CC; 
Qatar Art. 171 (2) CC; Russia Art. 451(2) CC; Syria Art. 148(2) CC; Taiwan Art. 227-2 
CC; The Netherlands Art. 6:258 Dutch Civil Code; Ukraine Art. 652 CC.  
165 Article 6.2.3(4) UNIDROIT PICC, Article 6:111(3) PECL as well as Article III – 
1:110(2)(b) DCFR; Art. 84 PLACL. 
166 Flechtner, 'The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention Including Comments 
on Hardship Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court', at 
102. 
167 Commenting Art. 6.6.2 UNIDROIT PICC McKendrick, 'Article 6.2.2', at 815, para. 
4. 
168 See Colombia Art. 868 CCom “prestación de futuro cumplimiento a cargo de una de las partes”. 
169 That is the case of Art. 6.2.2. UNIDROIT PICC; Art. 6:111 PECL; Art. 84 PLACL. 




disadvantaged party is not in a position to claim that the “ultimate limit of 
sacrifice” has been exceeded.170  
12.9 Ultimately, whether a contract may be adapted with regard to 
obligations already fulfilled should be answered by interpreting the parties’ 
behavior. A party who performed under the terms agreed without having 
raised the issue of hardship may give rise to a presumption that the 
imbalance threshold has not been reached. However, if the party affected 
by hardship went ahead with the performance of the obligation only after 
receiving assurances by its counterparty of subsequent renegotiations or a 
set-off against future deliveries, or if it was reasonable for the 
disadvantaged party to rely on prior renegotiation or adaptation practices, 
industry usages, the parties may be deemed to have impliedly agreed to the 
possibility of adapting the contract after performance.171 
2.13. UNDER THE CISG, A COURT OR ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL MAY NOT 
BRING THE CONTRACT TO AN END IN CASE OF HARDSHIP. 
13.1 The possibility of termination (or “avoidance” as in the 
language of the CISG) of the contract by a court or arbitral tribunal as a 
result of hardship is envisaged by the international instruments172 and 
many of the legal systems considered in this opinion.173 In common law 
jurisdictions, ipso facto termination (also called ipso iure termination)174 is the 
 
170 Schwenzer, 'Article 79', at 1135, 36, para. 15. However, most hardship rules do not 
impose the “not to overcome” requirement but, instead, provide the “substantial 
imbalance”, “more onerous” or “excessive onerous” prerequisite, e.g. Austria §§ 936, 
1052, 1170a BGB; France Art. 1195 CC; Germany § 313 BGB; Netherlands Art 6:258 
BW; Greece Art 388 CC; Portugal Art 437 CC. Moreover, Article 6.2.3(2) UNIDROIT 
PICC states that the request for negotiations does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged 
party to withhold performance. This provision highlights the possibility that 
renegotiations and other hardship remedies may take place despite performance by the 
disadvantaged party. 
171 This could result from the application of the principle of estoppel in Articles 16 and 
29 CISG. 
172 Art. 6.2.3(4) UNIDROIT PICC; Art. 6:111(3) PECL; Art. iii.-1:110(2) DCFR; Art. 
84(3) PLACL. 
173 Argentina Art. 1091 CCCom; Armenia Art. 467 CC; Azerbaijan Art. 422 CC; Bolivia 
Ar. 581 CC; Brazil Art. 478 CC; China Art. 26 PRC; Colombia Art. 868 CCom; Croatia 
Art. 369 CO; France Art. 1195 CC; Germany Sec. 313; Greece Art. 388 CC; Italy Art. 
1497 CC; Lithuania Art. 5.204 CC; Montenegro Art. 128 CO; Paraguay Art. 672; Portugal 
Art. 437 CC; Russia Art. 451 CC; Slovenia Art. 112 CO; The Netherlands Art. 6:258 CC; 
United States Section 2-615 UCC, Section 261 Restatement Second on Contracts. 
174 See Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 754, para. 47.182.: 
“Where avoidance of the contract does not require any action by the parties or by the 
adjudicators, this mechanism is sometimes termed ‘ipso facto avoidance’, sometimes it is 
called ‘ipso iure avoidance’. The first term focuses on the factual circumstances leading to 
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only remedy under the doctrine of frustration.175 Legal systems differ, 
however, with regard to the preference of the termination solution over 
other remedies such as negotiation or contract adaptation. In some 
systems, termination is clearly preferred over adaptation,176 while in others 
adaptation is favoured over termination.177  
13.2 There are also some differences in relation to the relevant 
mechanism by which termination operates in cases of hardship. In some 
legal systems termination takes effect ex nunc and only by an order of the 
court or arbitral tribunal.178 Other legal systems follow the English remedy 
under the doctrine of frustration of contract, embracing the termination 
of the contract ipso facto, as of the moment the contract is frustrated.179 
Both approaches, however, contradict the CISG modern solution of 
termination (avoidance as in its own language) by declaration by the 
aggrieved party;180 which is also the first proposed remedy under the ICC 
Hardship Clause 2020 should the parties fail to reach a solution through 
negotiation.181 Under this mechanism a notice given by the aggrieved party 
is sufficient for the contract to be terminated, the effects of termination 
taking place upon that moment.182 The advantages in comparison to the 
requirement of termination by court judgment is certainty and speed. 
When a contract is terminated ipso facto, the consequences may have taken 
effect without the parties being aware of it, whereas termination by court 
 
avoidance while the second term focuses in the legal operation following this act. Hence, 
although the terms are not synonymous, in the context of the mechanism of avoidance 
there is no difference as concerns the subject matter: avoidance of the contract without 
an act by the parties or the adjudicators”. 
175 See for example United States Art. 2-615 UCC, Restatement Second of Contracts § 
261 and E. Allan Farnsworth, 'The Restatement (Second) of Contracts', Rabels Zeitschrift 
für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht, 47/2 (1983), 336-40 at 340. 
176 See for example, Argentina 1041 CC; Brazil Art. 478 and 479 CC; Russia Art. 451(2) 
CC. In Bolivia Art. 581 CC and Italy Art. 1467 CC avoidance is the sole remedy available. 
177 See for example, Germany § 313(1) BGB; France Art. 1195 CC; Colombia Art. 868 
Com C. 
178 See for example, Argentina Art. 1091 CC; Bolivia Art. 581(1)(4) CC; Brazil Art. 478, 
479 CC; Colombia Art. 868 Com C; Paraguay Art. 672 CC; Russia Art. 451(2) CC; 
Slovenia Art. 994 Com C; see also Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract 
Law at 674, para. 45.119. 
179 See for example United States Art. 2-615 UCC, Restatement Second of Contracts § 
261 and Farnsworth, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts at 340; Schwenzer, Hachem, and 
Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 754, para. 47.183. 
180 Art. 26 CISG; for breach of contract see Art. 7.3.2(1) UNIDROIT PICC and Art. 
9:303(1) PECL. 
181 See ICC Hardship Clause, para. 3, Option A. 
182 Schwenzer, Hachem, and Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law at 758, para. 47.198. 




declaration will be impractical in many instances, especially where a party 
needs to conclude a substitute transaction in order to cover the other 
party’s breach. 
13.3 Consequently, the remedy of termination by party declaration 
under the CISG is the proper remedy to end contract in case of hardship.  
 
 
